By Jayne Fisher

In 1998 an overwhelming majority of the people of the island of Ireland voted for the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). In Britain, the Agreement won strong support. More than a decade later, the implementation of the Agreement is still progressing overcoming many crises.

The degree to which the peace process has transformed the situation positively cannot be underestimated. A political dispensation based on political inequality and exclusion has been replaced by one based on equality and recognition. A state based on institutional discrimination and social inequality has been undermined through the pursuit of an equality agenda. Although much work remains to be done, there have already been major advances. All of this progress in breaking down sectarianism and other forms of discrimination benefits society as a whole and undermines the sectarian basis of the state itself. Together with the economic necessity of developing real all-Ireland co-operation, it can be argued that there is a momentum at work towards Irish unity. The fundamental constitutional question of Ireland’s future as an independent, united country is posed. The argument here is that it has never been more relevant or desirable and is increasingly possible.

No-one should underestimate the significance of the arrangements whereby the Good Friday Agreement, for the first time ever in a binding international treaty, commits the British government to disengage from Ireland, should the people of Ireland desire it. It is worth revisiting what the Agreement actually says:

Under ‘Constitutional issues’ it recognises ‘that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish…’ It goes on to ‘affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right to self-determination [on the basis set in the Agreement]… to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish’.

Moreover, the agreement lays out mechanism for how this may be determined in the north of Ireland, by a border poll: ‘if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish…’

This is in essence an agreement which says the union is no longer set in stone — and may be changed through the expression of the popular democratic will.

The northern state was, of course, created on a gerrymandered basis, to ensure a unionist majority — with gross inequality, discrimination and distortion epitomising it through the intervening decades. The corresponding struggle in opposition to that, and the political strategy which emerged from it, could not be defeated. This fundamentally changed the balance of forces which resulted in the GFA coming into being. This political struggle is underpinned by the economic factors unleashed by independence of part of Ireland, as well as the decline of the British Empire. This is also seen in the demographic changes of the population in the north, its make-up and its voting patterns.

In short, a series of key economic, political, demographic and social trends all point towards the emergence of a nationalist majority in the north of Ireland in the foreseeable future, making Irish unity a distinct (some would say inevitable) possibility in a meaningful timescale.

One critical element of any discussion on the merits of Irish unity is to demonstrate that it is in peoples’ actual, material interests. The economic arguments for Irish unity are therefore key. The current economic crisis in the south, which the Dublin government’s policies have exacerbated and deepened, should not obscure this fact: that the independence of the 26 southern counties was the single most important positive economic event in the entire history of the island. It eventually laid the basis for an economic growth rate which saw the much poorer south surpass the north by some distance. At partition, per capita output in the north of Ireland was on a par with that of Britain. Today it is around one-quarter less, having declined 1.5 per cent in the last 10 years. Adjusting for price and currency differences, per capita GDP in the south surpassed that of Britain in 1998, and despite a more severe crisis, is still more than 16 per cent higher. The outcome is that, in a common currency and adjusting for price differences, the average weekly wage in the north is £357 and in the south it is £532.

Irish unity makes economic sense for the entire population of Ireland, north and south. For the north, it means the ability to break out of the economic straightjacket imposed by its colonial status. An increasing insertion into the global economy is a precondition for sustained growth, and one which is increasingly being achieved by former colonies, such as India.

For the south it means removing the dislocations caused by the border, and the ability to organise a rational economic development based on the organic unity of one economy on an island of just 6 million people. Every single person on the island would benefit regardless of political disagreements. Of course the political orientation and economic policy of any future government in Ireland will also be critical, as the ‘cuts not investment’ policies are currently showing. But it is impossible to determine a distribution of wealth and incomes without having national control over that income.

The development of an all-island economy, as part of any transition to unity, could be seen as being part and parcel of the all-Ireland elements set out in the GFA. Under the aegis of the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC), twelve areas were designated for structured north-south cooperation between the relevant ministers from Belfast and Dublin. These include education, health, transport, environment, agriculture and tourism. In addition six implementation bodies were set up to deal with specific issues on an all-island basis, including Intertrade Ireland, which has greatly increased the levels of north-south trading, as well as bringing companies of all sizes from across the island together in new partnerships and clusters.

Add to this the provisions for an all-Ireland Parliamentary Forum of elected representatives from north and south, and an all-Ireland Consultative civic forum, to bring together civic society, it is clear that the GFA contains an institutional framework, which, added to the economic arguments and the dynamics I shall now describe, could point towards the embryonic makings of a unitary state.

Within all of this, several important trends are developing within the ‘Northern Ireland’ state itself, which was founded on gerrymandering, perpetuated by sectarian, anti-Catholic discrimination. A combination of democratic rights, anti-discrimination legislation and the withering away of the in-built unionist majority represent a combination of factors potentially fatal to its continued existence.

First, the demographic trends are clear in relation to the census figures. In 1961, the proportion of the population describing itself as Catholic was 34.9 per cent. By 2001 that had risen to 40.3 per cent. The proportion of the population describing itself as Protestant has fallen from 62.5 per cent to 45.9 per cent. The proportions fro a Catholic and Protestant background re now 43.8 per cent and 53.1 per cent respectively. This trend is a function of two other developments. First, in common with most industrialised societies, the population is ageing. But the Protestant population is ageing faster, comprising more than 60 per cent of the population over 60 years of age. Secondly, a drop in the rate of Catholics emigrating is itself a response to a decline in job discrimination in certain sectors and increased political self-confidence. The proportion of Catholic school children at both primary and secondary levels is already a majority, rising to over 50 per cent in 2008/09.

Into this mix should be added the new, more recent development of new communities coming to Ireland, such as the 47,000 people, between mid-2002 and mid-2006 overwhelmingly from Eastern Europe.

Secondly, looking at the votes cast for political parties for the past 30 years reveals a clear rise in nationalist votes and a decline in the unionist vote. This is taking the objective criteria of Sinn Féin and the SDLP representing the nationalist vote as the only parties currently supporting Irish unity, and the remaining others, supporting the status quo, as unionist.

Westminster general elections since 1979 until the present show an increase in the nationalist vote by over 16 per cent. In 1979, when Sinn Féin did not stand, the combined nationalist vote — the SDLP and some nationalist independents — was 26 per cent. The combined unionist vote was around 72 per cent. In 1983, following the colossal struggle of the 1981 Hunger Strikes, and the election of Bobby Sands as MP for Fermanagh South Tyrone, the combined nationalist vote increased to 31 per cent, with the unionist vote at 67 per cent. The nationalist vote now included a republican vote and saw Gerry Adams gain his West Belfast seat for the first time. The shift continued through the next two decades, rising particularly sharply as a result of the peace process. By the 2005 Westminster election a combined nationalist vote rose to 41.8 per cent, with a unionist vote of around 57 per cent.

This pattern is mirrored in other elections. The 2009 European election saw a nationalist vote of 42.2 per cent to a unionist vote of 57 per cent. This had risen from 1989 Euro vote when the nationalists won 34 per cent, compared to a unionist 63 per cent. And in the Assembly elections 2007 the nationalist vote was 41.4 per cent; up from the 38 per cent at the 1996 Forum elections.

Economic, social and demographic trends could not, by themselves, produce the process of transformation we are currently witnessing. This required a political expression of the desire for equality and democracy, both with regard to voting rights and sectarian discrimination. By adopting its stance, Sinn Féin’s political strategy has drawn in new layers of people previously excluded from having any political voice, especially youth. Its equality agenda has led to a sharp growth in the employment of women from a catholic background, especially in the public sector. This is reflected in the fact that, while the nationalist vote has grown in aggregate, Sinn Féin’s rise has successively eclipsed the SDLP, becoming the largest party in the north. In the 1983 Westminster election, Sinn Féin won 13.4 per cent of the vote, compared with the SDLP’s 18 per cent. By 2005, Sinn Féin had increased this to 24.3 per cent, coming second to the DUP overall, with the SDLP on 17.5 per cent. By the 2009 Euro elections, Sinn Féin emerged as the single largest party with 26 per cent.

Sinn Féin’s political strategy has prevented any significant fragmentation within the nationalist/republican electorate, with the recent micro ‘republican’ splinter groups gaining negligible electoral support. In essence Sinn Féin has won more support both from existing SDLP voters, consolidated its base and gained new voters. In short, the electorate of the north of Ireland is becoming more nationalist, and more republican.

A nationalist party has become the largest single party for the first time since the partition of Ireland in 1921. That a republican party has achieved that has contributed to the political decline and splits within unionism.

Political unionism has been based on the denial of political and social equality. The consequent turmoil in unionism has been an incoherent combination of demands to turn back the clock, or at least continue to operate as though nothing has changed. It has led to a repeated divisions and multiplicity of unionist currents.

The rise and fall of the fortunes of the main unionist parties is inextricably linked to their dealing with — or resisting — the process of change. The 1987 Westminster general election saw the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) gain 37 per cent of the vote, to the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)’s 11 per cent, with nine UUP seats to the DUP’s four. In 2005, following the first period of the GFA, the DUP had reversed this, with 33.7 per cent and nine MPs, to the UUP’s 17.7 per cent, reduced to just one MP. Having signed up to the Agreement, the decline of the UUP reflects its resistance to implementing it, running scared as it was of the opposition to its right. This merely strengthened the DUP, and weakened support and confidence among the unionists electorate for the Agreement.

By 2007, following the Assembly elections, the DUP, as the largest party, were faced with the same issues; they too could not turn back the clock. In the event, they accepted power-sharing and went into government with Sinn Féin, precipitating the split of the ultra-rejectionist Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), who split unionism broadly three ways in the 2009 Euro elections winning 13 per cent of the vote. Faced with the same scenario as Trimble, the current DUP leadership are again facing the same potential drop in their own fortunes. After attempts to block and stall the Agreement — most recently on the critical policing and justice issue — the Agreement at Hillsborough has eventually seen progress made, with the added significance that it was achieved through direct negotiations between Sinn Féin and the DUP. Even as Cameron’s Conservatives rediscover their unionist roots, and threaten to tamper with the democratic core of the GFA, it is clear that there can be no return to the old way of ruling, with unionist dominance and veto.

The key point is that, in reality, the progressive political change taking place does not pose a single threat to the unionist population, nor any section of the community. Sinn Féin has set itself the decisive task of a dialogue with unionism, based on the key argument that they have nothing to fear but everything to gain from a united Ireland. The objective is not simply about winning 50 per cent plus one in any future border poll, nor subjugating any section of the community in the way that nationalists and Catholics were in the past. It is about truly creating an Ireland of equals. Gerry Adams has made clear; Sinn Féin’s view is that unionists can still be British in a united Ireland. Cultural identity and practices, including Orange marches have a right to exist, as long as they do not attack the rights of any other section of society.

There is, in fact, some shift in unionist attitudes. Recent polls show a change, albeit small, in unionist perceptions. Even before the latest crises, Martin McGuinness was voted the most popular politician in the North, with a 47 per cent approval rating. His 11 per cent approval among Unionists was not greatly lower than the 17 per cent for Peter Robinson. It is worth noting too that many from unionist backgrounds who come to live in Britain identify more with being Irish than being British — often in response to their treatment in Britain.

A united Ireland is therefore a serious and realistic prospect in the foreseeable future. A British government at some point have to come to terms with how it will leave Ireland finally. In Britain it is sensible to start discussing and preparing for this possibility now. We should ask, how are the government preparing for this possibility? The huge number of Irish people here, in all sections of society, along with other progressive people, can begin a serious discussion. The impact of the peace process has immeasurably transformed the position of Irish people in Britain.

After generations experienced discrimination and criminalisation, in an attempt to stop them from having a political voice on the question of their own country, and whilst many difficulties still remain to be addressed, the overall situation is transformed. The concerns of Irish people going back over many decades have to be central to the new discussion: what kind of future Ireland takes shape, how the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process can be built on and developed and how the relationship between the two islands can in future represent a hugely positive new chapter based on equality and justice.